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Keyboard Eavesdropping and Compromission Through Electromagnetic Optimal Coupling in a Cable Network (M/F)

This offer is available in the following languages:
- Français-- Anglais

Date Limite Candidature : lundi 4 mars 2024

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Informations générales

Intitulé de l'offre : Keyboard Eavesdropping and Compromission Through Electromagnetic Optimal Coupling in a Cable Network (M/F) (H/F)
Référence : UMR6164-PHIBES-001
Nombre de Postes : 1
Lieu de travail : RENNES
Date de publication : lundi 12 février 2024
Type de contrat : CDD Doctorant/Contrat doctoral
Durée du contrat : 36 mois
Date de début de la thèse : 1 octobre 2024
Quotité de travail : Temps complet
Rémunération : 2 135,00 € gross monthly
Section(s) CN : Micro and nanotechnologies, micro and nanosystems, photonics, electronics, electromagnetism, electrical energy

Description du sujet de thèse

This PhD aims at developing beyond-state-of-the-art electromagnetic attacks to compromise keyboard availability (denial of service) and integrity (fault injection). To that end, this work will focus on guided propagation medium such as power or communication cables, in order to enable non-line-of-sight attacks at an extended
range. The thesis is organized as follows:
- Electromagnetic compatibility study of keyboards for both immunity and susceptibility
- Development of denial-of-service and fault-injection attacks
- Attack range extension using spatial diversity [K. B. Yeo, M. Davy and P. Besnier, “Non-invasive Optimal Coupling Upon Detection of a Local Change of
Impedance in a Cable Network,” 2021 IEEE International Joint EMC/SI/PI and EMC Europe Symposium, Raleigh, NC, USA, 2021, pp. 528-532]
- Proposals for countermeasures
The PhD will take place at the IETR – UMR CNRS 6164
(www.ietr.fr) on the Beaulieu campus of the Université de Rennes, France. The PhD student will join the eWAVES team (Electromagnetic cybersecurity theme) and will benefit from IETR's world-class technological platforms including QOSC ((https://www.ietr.fr/plateforme-qosc-quantification-orientee-systemes-complexes).

Contexte de travail

The ubiquity of information systems leads to an ever-increasing cybercriminality
which is becoming the world's most lucrative criminal activity. An emerging threat concerns the use of electromagnetic waves to perform remote cyberattacks. In particular, keyboards are attractive targets because they are widely used as a computer peripheral and keystroke retrieval may lead to sensitive information recovery. Various attacks have been proposed in the literature to remotely retrieve keystrokes, by listening to first acoustic and then electromagnetic emanations [M. Vuagnoux and S. Pasini, “Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards,” Conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Berkeley, CA, USA, pp. 1–16, 2009]. However, the feasibility of denial-of-service attacks on computer keyboard remains an open challenge to be tackled in this Ph.D. thesis.

Le poste se situe dans un secteur relevant de la protection du potentiel scientifique et technique (PPST), et nécessite donc, conformément à la réglementation, que votre arrivée soit autorisée par l'autorité compétente du MESR.