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Portail > Offres > Offre UMR7503-STEKRE-001 - Chercheur H/F en sécurité du vote électronique

Researcher in security of electronic voting

This offer is available in the following languages:
Français - Anglais

Date Limite Candidature : mercredi 2 février 2022

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General information

Reference : UMR7503-STEKRE-001
Date of publication : Wednesday, January 12, 2022
Type of Contract : FTC Scientist
Contract Period : 12 months
Expected date of employment : 1 March 2022
Proportion of work : Full time
Remuneration : Between 4100 and 4300 EUR gross per month depending on experience.
Desired level of education : PhD
Experience required : Over 10 years


E-voting systems are now used in politically binding elections, for example in Estonia, Australia, Switzerland (in trials), and also in France for the French abroad. Due to the pandemic, its use has increased significantly in lower-stakes contexts, such as elections for representatives in academic councils or sports associations. The development of secure electronic voting is a hot topic and the candidate will collaborate with members of the PESTO team in one or more of the following three research areas:
(i) Proofs. The Swiss Chancellery requires symbolic and computational proofs of e-voting protocols prior to their deployment. We will conduct detailed case studies of several practical protocols such as BELENIOS or the protocols used in Switzerland. To carry out these proofs and to use bounded tools (e.g. DEEPSEC), reduction results of the "existence of a small attack" type will be developed. These studies will allow us to better understand the limitations of existing protocols, and will serve as a basis for the design of new, more robust protocols.
(ii) Design. Many properties are not yet satisfactorily addressed, such as "cast-as-intended" (guaranteeing that the voter's intention is taken into account, even if his or her computer is compromised) or resistance to vote buying. Voter authentication is also a weak point, which could be significantly improved by relying on chip-enabled ID cards, as is now the case in France. Another difficulty is the realization of a public ballot box, unique and visible to all. We would like to propose new
We would like to propose new voting protocols to improve each of these points, if possible in combination. We will be able to rely on the recent progress in cryptography that will be developed in the framework of priority project 2, in particular for multi-party computation (MPC) techniques. It will be important to take into account the human factor, i.e. to propose systems that can be used in practice by voters. In this context, we will continue to develop our Belenios voting platform (used in more than 1400 elections in 2020) to integrate the proposed new systems when they are compatible.
(iii) Models. Even a basic property such as voter privacy is difficult to define formally. We plan to continue our efforts to propose general definitions, not only for vote secrecy but also for vote buying resistance and accountability, for example. We will present definitions both in a symbolic and in a computational framework, and we will study their relations (implications and contradictions). Having both points of view is a strength for comparing definitions from different perspectives and checking their accuracy. On the other hand, a detailed understanding of the desired security properties and attacker models allows us to be a force of proposal when developing recommendations and requirements on electronic voting (by the CNIL or the ANSSI for example).


- Conducting research in collaboration with other members of the PESTO team.
- Writing scientific papers.
- (Co-)supervision of students.
- Security analysis of electronic voting systems, possibly interacting with the developers of the analysed solutions.
- Interaction with agencies such as the CNIL, or ANSSI.


The candidate is expected to have experience in one or more of the following areas
- Electronic voting;
- Cryptography;
- Formal analysis.
More generally, the candidate should have a good background in mathematics and theoretical computer science.

Work Context

The research will be carried out at LORIA in the PESTO team (https://team.inria.fr/pesto/).

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